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Price	  carbon	  —	  I	  will	  if	  you	  will	  	  
A	  common	  goal	  that	  is	  in	  everyone’s	  self-­‐interest	  is	  needed	  for	  countries	  to	  sign	  up	  to	  a	  strong	  climate	  
agreement	  at	  Paris,	  say	  David	  MacKay	  and	  colleagues.	  
	  
Climate-­‐change	  negotiations	  in	  Paris	  this	  December	  will	  adopt	  a	  ‘pledge	  and	  review’	  approach	  to	  cutting	  global	  
carbon	  emissions.	  Countries	  will	  promise	  to	  reduce	  their	  emissions	  by	  amounts	  that	  will	  be	  reviewed	  and	  revised	  
later.	  The	  narrative	  is	  that	  open	  review	  will	  “enable	  an	  upward	  spiral	  of	  ambition	  over	  time”1.	  Unfortunately,	  
history	  and	  the	  science	  of	  cooperation	  predict	  quite	  the	  opposite	  will	  happen.	  
Climate	  is	  a	  serious	  challenge	  because	  the	  atmosphere	  gives	  a	  free	  ride	  to	  countries	  that	  emit.	  If	  some	  nations	  
sit	  back	  and	  rely	  on	  others’	  cooperative	  efforts,	  the	  incentives	  for	  anyone	  to	  act	  are	  weakened.	  The	  comparable	  
review	  of	  Kyoto’s	  phase	  one,	  at	  the	  2012	  Doha	  conference,	  resulted	  in	  Japan,	  Russia,	  Canada,	  and	  New	  Zealand	  
leaving	  the	  agreement,	  frustrating	  those	  who	  kept	  their	  promises.	  	  
Success	  requires	  a	  common	  commitment,	  not	  a	  patchwork	  of	  individual	  commitments.	  The	  negotiation	  process	  
must	  be	  designed	  to	  redirect	  self-­‐interest	  to	  promote	  cooperation	  by	  using	  a	  common	  commitment	  to	  assure	  
players	   that	   others	  will	  match	   their	   efforts	   and	   not	   free-­‐ride.	   Simple	   game	   theory	   shows	   that	   this	  may	   be	  
achieved	  when	   interests	   are	   aligned.	   “I	   will	   if	   you	   will”	   is	   the	  most	   robust	   pattern	   of	   cooperation	   seen	   in	  
laboratory,	   field	  and	   theoretical	   studies	  of	   free-­‐rider	   situations,	  and	   is	   consistently	   found	   to	   stabilize	  higher	  
levels	  of	  cooperation2.	  
A	   global	   carbon	   price,	   so	   far	   excluded	   from	   consideration,	  would	   be	   the	   ideal	   basis	   for	   a	   flexible	   common	  
commitment	  in	  our	  view.	  A	  single	  price	  is	  easy	  to	  agree	  on,	  relatively	  fair,	  easy	  to	  handle,	   less	  vulnerable	  to	  
gaming	  than	  global	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade,	  and	  consistent	  with	  climate	  policies	  already	  in	  place,	  such	  as	  fossil-­‐fuel	  taxes	  
and	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade.	  	  
Only	  a	  common	  commitment	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  strong	  treaty	  that	  makes	  enforcement	  effective.	  	  
Pledges	  fail	  
Forty	  years	  of	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  literature	  on	  cooperation	  confirms	  that	  individual	  commitments,	  such	  
as	  pledged	  national	  contributions,	  do	  not	  deliver	  strong	  collective	  action.	  Cooperators	  will	  find	  that	  defectors	  
take	  advantage	  of	   them.	  As	   a	   result,	   initial	   ambition	  declines,	  when	   reviewing	   reveals	   that	  others	   are	   free-­‐
riding3.	  For	  example,	  without	  a	  common	  commitment	  that	  manages	  individual	  contributions,	  dishes	  often	  stack	  
up	  in	  the	  sinks	  of	  offices	  and	  shared	  apartments.	  But	  with	  an	  explicit	  common	  commitment	  governing	  grasslands	  
in	  the	  Alps,	  villagers	  have	  successfully	  managed	  the	  same	  commons	  for	  hundreds	  of	  years.4	  	  	  	  
Imagine	  that	  you	  and	  nine	  other	  self-­‐interested	  players	  (representing	  countries)	  play	  a	  game.	  Each	  player	  has	  
$10,	  of	  which	  they	  simultaneously	  pledge	  some	  part	  to	  the	  common	  pot.	  A	  referee	  makes	  sure	  they	  honor	  their	  
pledges.	  Every	  dollar	  (for	  CO2	  abatement)	  placed	  in	  the	  pot	  will	  be	  doubled	  (by	  climate	  benefits)	  and	  distributed	  
evenly	  to	  all	  players.	  So	  putting	  a	  dollar	  in	  the	  pot	  will	  return	  20¢	  to	  each	  player.	  
First,	  in	  the	  ‘individual	  commitment’	  game,	  pledges	  are	  independent	  of	  those	  of	  others.	  This	  is	  the	  classic	  public-­‐
goods	  game,	  in	  which	  the	  rational	  strategy	  for	  the	  narrowly	  self-­‐interested	  is	  to	  contribute	  nothing,	  since	  this	  
makes	  a	  player	  better	  off	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  others	  do.	  The	  result	   is	   the	   famous	  tragedy	  of	   the	  commons.	  
Cooperation	  does	  not	  occur	  even	  though	  everyone	  would	  gain	  from	  it.	  
Second,	  consider	  the	  ‘common	  commitment’	  game	  in	  which	  the	  same	  players	  commit	  to	  reciprocally	  match	  the	  
contribution	   of	   others,	   but	   not	   more.	   More	   specifically,	   suppose	   the	   referee	   simply	   makes	   sure	   that	   all	  
contribute	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  lowest	  submitted	  pledge.	  After	  enforcing	  this	  common	  commitment,	  the	  money	  
is	  doubled	  and	  distributed	  evenly,	  exactly	  as	  before.	  	  
This	   changes	  everything.	  Pledging	  $0	  will	  mean	  simply	  keeping	  your	  $10,	  while	  pledging	  $10	  could	   result	   in	  
ending	  up	  with	  anything	  between	  $10	  and	  $20,	  depending	  on	  what	  others	  pledge.	  So,	  since	  you	  cannot	  lose	  and	  
could	  gain	  by	  pledging	  $10,	  that’s	  what	  you	  would	  do,	  even	  if	  you	  are	  completely	  selfish.	  So	  all	  pledge	  $10,	  and	  
the	  group’s	  $100	  is	  doubled	  and	  all	  end	  up	  with	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  $20.	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Because	   the	   common	   commitment	   protects	   against	   free-­‐riding,	   selfish	   behavior	   has	   been	   changed	   from	  
“contribute	  nothing”	  to	  “contribute	  everything”;	  the	  outcome	  from	  no	  cooperation	  to	  full	  cooperation.	  
The	  Kyoto	  negotiators	   initially	  did	   try	   to	  agree	  a	  common	  commitment	  expressed	   in	   terms	  of	  a	   formula	   for	  
setting	  emissions	  caps	  for	  individual	  countries,	  but	  they	  failed	  to	  find	  an	  acceptable	  common	  formula.	  In	  the	  
end	  each	  nation	  was	  asked	  to	  “submit	  their	  final	  numbers	  to	  the	  podium.”	  Those	  numbers	  were	  simply	  inserted	  
into	   the	   blank	   draft	   annex	  B5.	   The	   result	   was	   a	   patchwork	   of	   weak	   and	   unstable	   individual	   commitments.	  
Similarly,	   in	   response	   to	   the	   Copenhagen	   accord	   which	   invited	   voluntary	   individual	   commitments,	   China	  
pledged	  to	  do	  exactly	  what	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Energy,	  a	  year	  earlier,	  had	  predicted	  it	  would	  do	  anyway,	  
without	   cooperation,	   and	   India	   pledged	   half	   of	   the	   DOE	   prediction.	   Annual	   reviews	   did	   not	   cause	   them	   to	  
increase	  their	  ambition.	  	  
Enforcement	  is	  widely	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  missing	  ingredient	  in	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  and	  crucial	  for	  the	  success	  of	  
a	  Paris	  agreement.	  This	  is	  half	  right.	  Both	  enforcement	  and	  a	  common	  commitment	  are	  required6.	  For	  example,	  
if	  people	  chose	  their	  own	  road	  speed	  limits,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  use	  enforcing	  them,	  as	  everyone	  would	  drive	  at	  
their	  desired	  speed.	  Instead,	  because	  it	  limits	  others	  as	  well	  as	  themselves,	  people	  agree	  to	  a	  common	  speed	  
limit	  which	  is	  lower	  than	  almost	  everyone’s	  individual	  limit.	  In	  other	  words,	  with	  individual	  commitments,	  there	  
is	  nothing	  meaningful	  to	  enforce;	  whereas,	  enforcement	  strengthens	  a	  common	  commitment.	  	  
What	   could	   all	   countries	   commit	   to?	   National	   limits	   on	   the	   quantity	   of	   emissions	   will	   not	   work.	   Kyoto	  
negotiators	  tried,	  and	  suggested	  at	  least	  10	  formulae	  to	  determine	  the	  reductions	  each	  nation	  should	  make,	  yet	  
they	  could	  not	  agree.	  When	  attention	  turned	  to	  reducing	  emissions	  by	  a	  constant	  percentage	  relative	  to	  1990,	  
individual	  commitments	  ranged	  from	  an	  8%	  decrease	  to	  a	  10%	  increase.	  And	  within	  the	  EU’s	  8%	  decrease,	  EU-­‐
member-­‐states’	  commitments	  ranged	  from	  a	  decrease	  of	  30%	  to	  an	  increase	  of	  40%.	  The	  US	  and	  developing	  
countries	  accepted	  no	  commitments	  at	  all.	  	  
Kyoto’s	  percent-­‐emission-­‐reduction	  concept	  failed	  because	  countries	  differ	  in	  many	  ways;	  for	  instance,	  some	  
economies	  declined	  after	  1990	  and	  some	  grew.	  To	  be	  cautious,	   the	  developing	  countries	  must	  build	   in	  high	  
growth	  aspirations,	  implying	  rapidly	  increasing	  caps.	  Rich	  countries	  oppose	  this,	  and	  so	  poor	  countries	  fear	  being	  
saddled	  with	  caps	  that	  curb	  their	  growth.	  Instead	  they	  see	  it	  as	  fair	  to	  allocate	  emission	  permits	  on	  an	  equal	  
per-­‐capita	  basis.	  Because	  this	  would	  result	  in	  huge	  wealth	  transfers	  from	  rich	  to	  poor	  countries,	  such	  proposals	  
are	  unacceptable	  to	  the	  rich7.	  
In	   fact,	   there	   is	   no	   longer	   any	   serious	   discussion	   of	   a	   common	   quantity	   commitment.	   The	   US	   government	  
concurs	   that	   the	   approach	  will	   not	  work8.	   Developing	   countries	   still	   have	   not	   accepted	   it	  within	   the	   Kyoto	  
framework.	  A	  common	  quantity	  commitment	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  at	  COP	  21	  in	  Paris.	  	  
Price	  carbon	  	  
We,	  and	  others,	  propose	  an	  alternative:	  a	  global	  carbon	  price	  commitment9.	  Each	  country	  would	  commit	  to	  
placing	   enough	   nationally-­‐retained	   charges	   on	   their	   own	   use	   of	   fossil	   fuels	   to	   meet	   the	   common	   price	  
commitment.	  The	  price	  level	  could	  be	  determined	  by	  voting—by	  a	  super-­‐majority	  rule	  that	  would	  produce	  a	  
coalition	  of	  the	  willing.	  Note	  that	  a	  uniform	  price	  is	  already	  widely	  accepted	  as	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  way	  to	  
curb	  emissions.	  
Carbon	  pricing	  is	  flexible,	  allowing	  fossil	  taxes,	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade,	  hybrid	  schemes	  and	  other	  national	  policies	  to	  be	  
used	   (unlike	   a	   global	   carbon	   tax).	   All	   that	   is	   required	  of	   a	   country	   is	   that	   its	   average	   carbon	  price—carbon	  
revenue	  divided	  by	  carbon	  emissions—be	  at	  least	  as	  high	  as	  the	  global	  carbon	  price.	  
Unlike	  global	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade,	  carbon	  pricing	  allows	  countries	  to	  keep	  all	  carbon	  revenues,	  thus	  eliminating	  the	  
risk	  of	  needing	  to	  buy	  expensive	  credits	  from	  a	  rival	  country.	  A	  country	  can	  hold	  its	  total	  taxes	  constant	  by	  a	  
green	  tax-­‐shift—reducing	  taxes	  on	  good	  things	  such	  as	  employment	  by	  charging	  for	  pollution.	  Shifting	  taxes	  
from	  good	  things	  to	  bad	  things	  could	  mean	  there	  is	  no	  net	  social	  cost	  to	  pricing	  carbon,	  even	  before	  counting	  
climate	  benefits10.	  	  
Of	  course	  a	  global	  price	  does	  not	  automatically	  result	  in	  acceptable	  burden	  sharing.	  A	  ‘Green	  Climate	  Fund’	  will	  
be	  needed	  to	  transfer	  funds	  from	  rich	  to	  poor	  countries.	  To	  minimize	  disputes	  over	  fairness,	  the	  objective	  of	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climate-­‐fund	  transfers	  should	  be	  to	  maximize	  the	  global	  price	  of	  carbon.	  This	  can	  be	  implemented	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
encourages	   rich	   countries	   to	  be	  generous	  and	  poor	   countries	   to	   vote	   for	   a	  higher	   global	   carbon	  price,11	  for	  
example,	  by	  making	  all	  climate-­‐fund	  payments	  proportional	  to	  the	  agreed-­‐upon	  carbon	  price.	  
After	   decades	   of	   failure,	   a	   fresh	   approach	   is	   needed—one	   that	   is	   guided	   by	   the	   science	   of	   cooperation.	   A	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